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Abstract. In this paper, I elaborate on the role of agent-based (AB) modelling for 
macroeconomic research. My main tenet is that the full potential of the AB approach has not 
been realized yet. This potential lies in the modular nature of the models, which is bought by 
abandoning the straitjacket of rational expectations and embracing an evolutionary perspective. 
I envisage the foundation of a Modular Macroeconomic Science, where new models with 
heterogeneous interacting agents, endowed with partial information and limited computational 
ability, can be created by recombining and extending existing models in a unified computational 
framework.  
 
Acknowledgements. This paper has benefited from insightful discussions with Doyne Farmer, 
Dan Tang, David Pough, Christoph Aymanns and other researchers at the Institute of New 




INTRODUCTION. Though there are early antecedents, it’s now at least two decades that 
agent-based (AB) models have been introduced to economics.1 It is therefore time to ask 
whether they have marked an impact on the way economics, and especially macroeconomics, is 
done, and what their future prospects look like. This is all the more relevant given the debate on 
macroeconomic modelling which was prompted by the Great Recession, and Ricardo 
Caballero’s suggestion that macroeconomics should be in “broad exploration” mode [Caballero 
2010].  
Forecasting the future is notably a difficult exercise, but a common perception is that AB 
models have “a bright future past them”: they have been charged with high expectations, 
especially from outside the mainstream literature, which they somewhat failed to live up to. 
With respect to mainstream economic models, AB models trade off individual sophistication (in 
expectation formation and decision making) with complexity in the interaction structure and 
richness in the institutional details. The rational expectations (RE) hypothesis at the core of 
mainstream economic models, with its strong consistency requirements –all actions and beliefs 
must be mutually consistent at all times– requires simplistic models. This is replaced in AB 
models by the assumption of partial information and limited computational ability, which brings 
in milder evolutionary requirements: corrections must take place, through learning, selection or 
reactions in the environment. The resulting increased flexibility in model specification, 
however, has downsides: (i) assumptions are sometimes deemed arbitrary and disconnected 
from the literature, suggesting a return to the sort of anarchy that was lamented before the RE 
revolution [Wickens 2014], (ii) models often exhibit too many degree of freedoms, and are 
therefore non-falsifiable, (iii) models often lack a sound empirical grounding; when present, this 
is often limited to some ad hoc calibration [Grazzini and Richiardi 2015]. Other common 
critiques point to the fact that (iv) models are oftentimes poorly documented and hardly 
replicable [Leombruni et al. 2006], and (v) writing an AB model requires quite a lot of 
programming skills; code is often not re-usable and projects are not incremental [Leombruni 
and Richiardi 2005]. 
A search on EconLit returns 5,705 articles for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE), Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian (NK) models since 1980, and only 




Figure 1: Number of articles retrieved in the EconLit database (all types of publications) 
searching for “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium”, “Real Business Cycle”, “New 
Keynesian”, “Agent-based”, variants and acronyms, 19/1/ 2015. 
 
Does this graph suggest that AB modelling is ready for take off, as the new consensus in 
macroeconomics in the early 2000s, or that it has already levelled off? In this paper I argue that 
in order to reap all the benefits of the AB approach, a change in strategy is required, and this 
allows to address all the critiques listed above.  
Abandoning the consistency requirements of RE equilibrium removes the need for solving the 
models as one single block: in principle AB models can be fully modularized, with endless 
possibilities for recombination and extension. However, this feature has not been exploited so 
far. Existing AB models are mostly one-off exercises which do not travel across research groups 
and whose “working life” does not usually extend beyond the grant that originated them. Code 
is not re-used, except possibly by the authors themselves; alternative assumptions are not tested, 
results are not generalized. In short, knowledge accumulates at a slow pace. The reason for this 
“modelling individualism”, as we might call it, is to be searched in the struggle to win the 
“modelling race”, in line with existing incentives in terms of (short-term) publications and 
funding opportunities. 
Conversely, by fully exploiting the modular nature of AB models, a common computational 
environment can be built, where different behavioral assumption, markets and institutional 
frameworks can be implemented as separate simulation modules. Classification of and 
experimentation with different behavioral assumption, from choice heuristics to learning and 
expectation formation, will then provide a firm foundation for the modelling assumptions made 
(critique i above); comparison of different specifications will allow to reduce the number of 
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parameters to a minimum and focus on lean structures (point ii); adoption of common 
computational interfaces will allow the development of standard simulation-based estimation 
procedures (point iii) and will directly address points (iv) and (v).  
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 suggests that mainstream 
macroeconomic models are not “systemic” models, and are thus not suited for analyzing 
endogenous changes in the economic structure, like those we have experienced during the Great 
Recession. Section 3 discusses why these models cannot be further extended in order to provide 
such a vital development. Section 4 explains why AB models, by departing from the strict 
requirements of RE equilibrium analysis in favor of an evolutionary approach, can provide a 
valid alternative. Section 5 elaborates on the “double dividend” that can be obtained from 
moving away from RE, as models can in principle be fully modularized. Section 6 discusses the 
main challenges that a new Modular Macroeconomic Science faces, as agents have to share 
common ontologies (an ontology is a part of the agent's knowledge base that describes what 
kind of things an agent can deal with and how they are related to each other). Section 7 suggests 
a practical roadmap for testing the new modular approach and build a Modular Macroeconomic 
Simulator, developed using a readily accessible simulation platform. Finally, section 8 discusses 
why the modular approach has not yet materialized in AB modelling, and why the AB research 
community should actively engage in a collaborative effort to help the prediction of a future 
Modular Macroeconomic Science become true. 
 
THE GREAT RECESSION POSES A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO MAINSTREAM 
MACRO. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, the standard tool for 
macroeconomic analysis, have been deeply challenged by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
and the Great Recession that followed. As Jean-Claude Trichet [2010], at the time President of 
the European Central Bank, stated:  
“When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial models 
immediately became apparent. [...] Macro models failed to predict the crisis and seemed 
incapable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a convincing manner. As 
a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In fact, I 
would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools”.  
Brad Delong [2011] reports that when the former U.S. secretary Lawrence Summers was asked 
to “name where to turn to understand what was going on in 2008, [he] cited three dead men, a 
book written 33 years ago, and another written the century before last”. Summers was pointing 
to the work of Bagehot [1873], Kindleberger [1978] and Minsky [1982; 1986], well before the 
New Neoclassical Synthesis, the “gold standard” that emerged in the 1990s from the clash 
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between two competing business cycle theories, the Real Business Cycle (RBC) and the New 
Keynesian (NK) paradigm. Somewhat ironically, Olivier Blanchard [2009] declared that “the 
state of Macro is good”, just before the Great Moderation almost anagrammatized into an 
Armageddon for Macroeconomics. The limits of the DSGE approach at the core of the New 
Neoclassical Synthesis have been analyzed and exposed by a number of prominent voices [e.g. 
Kirman 2010; Krugman 2011; Stiglitz 2011; for a less technical note, Smith 2014], and not only 
in the aftermath of the crisis [Colander 2006; Colander et al. 2008]. As Ricardo Caballero 
[2010] has vividly expressed, the DSGE approach “has become so mesmerized with its own 
internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with 
the precision that it has about the real one". This logic is built upon the implicit view that 
markets and economies are inherently stable and that they only temporarily get off track, when 
they are perturbed by external shocks, and fails to recognize that the interaction between 
heterogeneous agents and the institutional environment can produce endogenous business 
cycles, possibly leading to systemic crises. In DSGE models the existence of occasionally large 
booms and busts is explained by the occurrence of large exogenous shocks, while nothing in the 
model leads to non-normality [De Grauwe 2012]. Indeed, DSGE models are unable to 
reproduce the observed non-normal distributions of many macro variables, even when fed with 
shocks drawn from fat tail distributions [Ascari et al. 2013].  
Inclusion of financial frictions in a new vintage of DSGE models has improved their ability to 
reproduce observed features of the big post-crisis recession [Brzoza-Brzezina et al. 2013], like 
the little sensitiveness of inflation to the output gap [e.g. Christiano et al. 2015; Del Negro et al. 
2015]. However, the emergence of the large financial shock that originated the Great Recession 
in the first place is left unexplained. Similarly, the transition from the Great Inflation to the 
Great Moderation is mainly explained with “luck” - shocks becoming more benign in the latter 
period [Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2010]. Hence, the most important macroeconomic events of 
the past 50 years are “explained” with exogenously given random disturbances. To the extent 
that “shocks are a measure of our ignorance” [Abramovitz 1956], the theory seems to be 
missing something quite fundamental. In DSGE models there is no causal link between a boom 
and a bust by construction, except for small self-correcting deviations from the deterministic 
steady state, so the stable period can be understood as separate from the unstable period. Yet if 
the boom and the bust are caused by the same process, then understanding one entails 
understanding the other. DSGE models with financial frictions have indeed yielded predictions 
that are in line with some of Minsky’s insights (e.g. the financial accelerator leading to a 
“Minsky moment”, a sudden major collapse of asset values which shapes the credit and business 
cycle). However, they fail to incorporate the major intuition of Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis: stability can be destabilizing, sowing the seeds of its own demise. In tranquil times, 
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banks become less cautious in extending credit and firms less cautious in borrowing; this results 
in endogenous financial fragility.  
Also, the vast literature on individual heterogeneity within the DSGE framework [Heatcote et 
al. 2009] is largely confined to investigating the role of idiosyncratic income shocks in affecting 
labor supply, hence output. A crucial stylized fact that DSGE models fail to reproduce is 
inequality in the distribution of work – the fact that some individuals are fully employed while 
others remain unemployed. In downturns and recessions, aggregate demand is what matters, and 
it can be affected in fundamental ways by the distribution of income: in DSGE models “there is 
no discussion of differing marginal propensities to consume, which can serve as the basis of 
stimulative redistributive policies” [Stiglitz 2011]. Moreover, there is no consideration of other 
asymmetries able to produce network and cascade effects, like commercial or credit links 
between firms. 
 
DSGE MODELS CANNOT BECOME “SYSTEMIC” MODELS. Taking a step back, New 
Keynesian DSGE models did a reasonable job in describing advanced economies during normal 
times, though admittedly with a number of ad-hoc (and non-Lucas compliant) patches –with a 
metaphor, it is as DSGE models were doctors specialized in healthy patients. However, (i) 
assistance from models –as from doctors– is mostly needed when the conditions are bad and 
unstable, (ii) even in tranquil times, it is unclear whether DSGE models are of much practical 
relevance: as an example, the “bad luck vs. bad policies” literature on the causes of the Great 
Inflation showed that monetary authorities were following the Taylor principle even before John 
Taylor “invented” it, and long before it was rationalized in NK models [Fernández-Villaverde et 
al. 2010]. Can DSGE be further stretched to analyze economic systems, and not only specific 
economic periods? If capital is added to the most basic models, or the (log)linear approximation 
–equivalent to the assumption that the economy undergoes only small and gradual changes– is 
dropped, analytical solutions become out of reach. Introducing more heterogeneity, behavioral 
articulation, or institutional details, quickly results in intractable optimization, because agents 
have to solve too complicated forward-looking problems.  
This stringent trade-off originates from the RE hypothesis: the assumption that people have 
probability beliefs that coincide with the probabilities predicted by the model, essentially 
meaning that agents perfectly understand their environment (the model), and that they are able 
to compute fixed points in the strategy space. Beyond analytical tractability, this assumption –at 
the cornerstone of modern macro– allows expectations and hence behavior to react 
instantaneously to announcements of future policy changes, while in pre-Lucasian models 
(naïve) adaptive expectations would have been revised only after the policy were actually 
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implemented, and only gradually [Wickens 2014]. Attempts to devise mechanisms of 
expectation formation which depart from RE and are sensitive to information [Woodford 2013] 
are mainly based on the statistical learning approach [Evans and Honkapohja 2009; 2013], 
where agents are modelled as econometricians in making forecasts. This literature has 
investigated under what conditions agents are able to learn the true DGP of the process, and 
consequently converge to the RE equilibria. However, it is still based on a sophisticated view of 
the agents and it does not take into consideration the broader literature on bounded rationality 
and the role of heuristics [Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Gigerenzer et al. 2011], adaptive learning 
in evolutionary game theory [Durieu and Solal 2012], social learning in networks [Mobius and 
Rosenblat 2014] and other findings coming from psychology [Della Vigna 2009], which can 
result in more complex aggregate dynamics. 
 
MACROECONOMIC RESEARCH IN ‘BROAD-EXPLORATION’ MODE. Overall, this 
discussion brings us back to Caballero [2010], who warns that “[o]n the methodology front, 
macroeconomic research has been in ‘fine-tuning’ mode within the local-maximum of the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium world, when we should be in ‘broad-exploration’ 
mode.” AB models are one promising direction for exploration [Freeman 1998; Colander 2005; 
LeBaron and Tesfatsion 2008; Farmer and Foley 2009; Stiglitz and Gallegati 2011]. From the 
policy side, Jean-Claude Trichet himself supported this view: “We need to deal better with 
heterogeneity across agents and the interaction among those heterogeneous agents. We need to 
entertain alternative motivations for economic choices. [...] Agent-based modelling dispenses 
with the optimisation assumption and allows for more complex interactions between agents. 
Such approaches are worthy of our attention” [Trichet 2010].  
AB models are structural dynamical models characterized by three features [Richiardi 2012]: (i) 
there are a multitude of objects that interact with each other and with the environment, (ii) these 
objects are autonomous, that is there are no central, or “top-down” coordination devices (e.g. the 
Walrasian auctioneer), and (iii) aggregation is performed numerically. Note that neither the 
presence of micro-foundations nor the computational nature defines the methodology, as this is 
shared by most state-of-the-art macro models. A crucial role in AB models is played by 
heterogeneity: this includes partial knowledge of the environment, and limited and differentiated 
computational ability. Rather than following axioms of logical consistency and computing fixed 
points, they follow simple heuristics based on psychological plausibility and ecological 
effectiveness: ecological rationality appears when the structure of the boundedly rational 
decision mechanisms [Altman 2006] matches the structure of information in the environment 
[Todd and Gigerenzer 2012]. These heuristics are evolved through learning and selection 
[Hommes 2013], with a crucial distinction being whether learning takes place at an individual or 
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a social level [Vriend 2000].  
In AB models learning need not be only backward-looking [Kirman 2011]. For instance, in an 
“agenized” version of the Smets and Wouters [2003] model, Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion [2015] 
compare (i) reinforcement learning, (ii) Q-learning, (iii) a forward-looking rolling-horizon 
method, and (iv) an adaptive dynamic programming method based on value-function 
approximation. They find that simpler decision rules can outperform more sophisticated ones –
but only if they entail some sort of forward-looking behavior coupled with a relatively long 
memory. De Grauwe and Markiewicz [2013] compare statistical learning and fitness learning 
and find that the first cannot replicate the observed disconnection of the market rates from the 
underlying fundamentals (the latter is not able to replicate volatility clustering). Also, agents can 
endogenously switch between different learning rules. For instance Anufriev and Hommes 
[2013], based on the heuristic switching model of Brock and Hommes [1997], distinguish 
between negative and positive feedback systems and show that in the first adaptive heuristics 
end up dominating, whereas in the latter trend-following heuristics prevail.  
The concept of equilibrium also changes. In rational expectation models, equilibrium is defined 
as a consistency condition in the behavioral equations: agents must act consistently with their 
expectations, and the actions of all the agents must be mutually consistent. The system is 
therefore always in equilibrium, even during a phase of adjustment to a shock. By converse, 
equilibria in AB models are defined only at the aggregate level and only in statistical terms, 
when macro-outcomes become stationary [Grazzini and Richiardi 2015].  
This methodological stance removes a lot of technical constraints in model building, allowing 
for more flexibility in model specification. In particular, the use of simple learning mechanisms 
coupled with evolutionary mechanisms that allow “learning about learning” drastically reduces 
the difficulty of the choice problem of the agents, and consequently the computational 
complexity of the model. This permits to introduce more institutional details, as in the 
modelling of specific markets [Tesfatsion 2011; Li and Tesfatsion 2012] or market clearing 
mechanisms (e.g. an order book, see Paddrik et al. [2014]), and more complex interactions 
including, for instance, production or credit networks [Weisbuch and Battiston 2007; Battiston 
et al. 2007; 2012; Delli Gatti et al. 2010]. AB macro models typically target a higher number of 
stylized macro facts than DSGE models [Dawid and Neugart 2015; Neugart and Richiardi 
2015]. They have arguably been successful in analyzing systemic risk [Geanakoplos et al. 2012] 
and macroprudential regulations [Teglio et al. 2012; Poledna et al. 2014], the role of innovation 
policies [Ballot and Taymaz 2001; Dawid et al. 2014; Hommes and Zeppini 2014], endogenous 
business cycles and stabilization policies in economies with imperfect information and 
incomplete credit markets [Delli Gatti et al. 2005 and subsequent papers; Dosi et al. 2010, 
2013], the stability of general equilibrium [Gintis 2007]. An active role in the development of 
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AB macro models has been played by the European Commission with the funding of three 
large-scale projects: EURACE3, aimed at developing an AB software platform for European 
economic policy design, POLHIA4, aimed and analyzing monetary, fiscal and structural 
policies, and CRISIS5, aimed at understanding systemic instabilities. However, but for a few 
exceptions - from Schelling [1969] to Gintis [2007] or Geneakoplos et al. [2010] - research in 
AB modelling has mainly been confined to the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
and the Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, as if there was a glass ceiling impeding to 
reach a wider audience. 
 
THE VISION FOR A NEW MODULAR MACROECONOMIC SCIENCE. To rephrase 
the basic argument, the defining peculiarity of AB models, vis-à-vis mainstream economic 
models, is a departure from RE equilibrium in favor of an evolutionary approach, where 
evolution basically means learning (at an individual or social level). Avoiding the need to solve 
for RE equilibria saves a lot of computing time: this can be spent to complicate the models, 
introducing more realistic assumptions. Mainstream economics does not like this trade-off, as it 
reminds of the sort of pre-Lucasian anarchy. However, there is a “double dividend” of moving 
away from RE, which has not been reaped so far and that may change the nature of the 
(modelling) game. Because equilibria (defined as stationary states) are not analytically derived 
or imposed but explored by simulations - which prompts the definition of AB modelling as 
generative social science6 - parts of the computer program can be easily replaced without 
compromising the ability to understand the model behavior (that is, without necessarily 
compromising execution speed). This is, in essence, modularity. Modularity allows the division 
of labor which, as every economist after Adam Smith knows, is a driving force in boosting 
productivity. Exploiting modularity means that individual researchers and research groups can 
develop and refine modules that fit into larger models. Different modules (e.g. labor demand 
and supply, credit demand and supply, production, consumption, household formation, 
retirement, etc.) can then be combined within the same modelling environment into new 
models, as in a Lego™ construction game. Institutional arrangements (e.g. market clearing 
mechanisms) and behavioral characteristics (e.g. decision rules, expectation formation rules, 
learning rules) can also be typified and implemented as separate blocks. This makes it possible 
to combine the labor supply module of author X with labor demand and production modules of 
author Y, the housing market module of author Z, etc., specifying for each module how agents 
form their expectation, interact with other agents, and take their decisions. In turns, this allows 
the systematic comparison and assessment of assumptions: convergence on a common set of 
modelling choices, possibly as an alternative to those employed in DSGE modelling, is then 
facilitated because their properties across a wide range of models become known, and consensus 
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“workhorse” models emerge out of the collaborative effort of a community of researchers.7  
In other words, the vision for a new Modular Macroeconomic Science entails a meta-modelling 
strategy aimed at the systematic investigation of the effects of different modelling choices and 
their systematic empirical validation, possibly drawing from developments across disciplines, 
including computer science, management science, cognitive science and psychology. Inspiration 
comes from atmospheric modelling, where additional components (like carbon models, sea-ice 
and glacial-ice models, atmospheric chemistry models, land-surface models, etc.) are developed 
and refined, and then added to a core global circulation model. 
 
CHALLENGES. A necessary requirement for AB modelling to evolve into a new Modular 
Macroeconomic Science is the development of appropriate application programming interfaces 
(APIs) to allow communication between different modules of the same agent, or between 
different agents. These are a set of routines, protocols, and tools which define functionalities 
internally used by the simulated agents (e.g. learning algorithms) or used by the agents to 
interact with other agents (exchange of information, goods and services) that are independent of 
their respective implementations. Note that I am not envisaging here the adoption of one 
common simulation platform, which besides being unattainable, is also undesirable. 
Competition between different simulation platforms, from general purposes programming 
languages (e.g. C++, Java, Python, Scala), possibly integrated with simulation specific libraries 
(e.g. Mason8, RePast9, JAS-mine10), to general-purpose mathematical software (e.g. 
Mathematica, Mathlab or Matcad, or agent-based specific languages (Netlogo11), is a good thing 
because it foster improvements and provides cross-validation of the different implementations. 
What is needed is rather an abstract protocol to which the different implementations should 
adhere. This protocol should also be neutral about the hardware characteristics of the 
implementation (synchronous vs. asynchronous). Here I just provide some preliminary thoughts 
about how such a protocol might look like.  
As a preliminary remark, note that a protocol for modelling economic agents is different from a 
standard for agents’ communication in multi-agent systems. For instance, the Foundation for 
Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), an IEEE Computer Society standards organization, provides 
a collection of standards for the interoperability of heterogeneous agents and the services they 
represent. The FIPA standards defines how messages should look like, but fall short of 
providing requirements about their content. Available standards deal with agents’ interaction, 
but they have nothing to say about the structure and behavior of economic agents. 
Modularization requires, possibly on top of existing communication standards, the definition of 
appropriate APIs for such economic agents (economic APIs).  
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Also, the economic APIs are different from protocols related to the internal implementation of 
the agents. These protocols solve important problems and should be adopted to ensure an 
efficient and robust software architecture, but they do not allow by themselves the 
modularization of the models.12  
From a general perspective, economic agents are characterized by states, parameters and 
actions. More specifically, the states include the following: (i) individual characteristics –in the 
case of a person: age, sex, location, abilities, family status, work status, health status, etc.; in the 
case of a firm: size, location, industry, labor force composition, etc. – possibly including the 
networks agents are linked to; (ii) endowments (money, time, assets); (iii) expectations about 
relevant variables; (iv) some measure of fitness (or utility). 
Actions can modify an agent’s internal state, and possibly other agents’ states as well. States can 
also change due to factors which are independent of an agent’s actions (think of ageing, or 
depreciation of human and physical capital). Irrespective to whether they change according to 
own actions, actions of others, or independently of any actions, I refer to states as governed by 
state-specific law of motions, on the basis of some individual-specific parameters.13 Among the 
actions an agent can take, of particular importance for an economic agent is the ability to make 
transactions, that is, engaging in market exchanges. Transactions involve deliberately 
swapping, or commit to swap at future dates –possibly conditional on specific conditions being 
met– some endowments for others, and can also be thought of as contracts14. The main 
characteristics that makes endowments the object of transactions is that they can be cumulated 
(though they might depreciate). Nothing precludes an agent from having negative endowments 
(that is, borrowing). Stocks and flows of endowments are registered in a balance sheet.  
Finally, choices about actions (including transactions) are determined by decision rules, 
individuals-specific functions that take as an input the state of an agent, possibly the states of 
other agents, and the parameters. 
Therefore, what is needed to model an economic agent is a set of parameters; a list of individual 
characteristics; a list of endowments; for each of the endowments, a list of (conditional) 
commitments to future transactions15; a list of actions; a set of decision rules; for each forward-
looking variable entering a decision rule, a vector of expectations about its future values; for 
each state, a law of motion; a list of fitness measures.16 
Figure 2 provides a schematic representation. 
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Figure 2: Scheme of an economic agent. 
 
Modularizations, in this context, means : 
i) as many components of an agent as possible are classified and implemented as 
separate objects, so that an agent can be equipped with alternative, ready to use, 
specifications; when none is deemed appropriate, modifications can easily be 
introduced, and saved as new modules; 
ii) interaction between different agents, possibly playing different roles, follows simple 
protocols that allow to change the internal functioning of an agent without having to 
modify those of other agents.  
Point (i) essentially involves the typification of laws of motion and decision rules. Among the 
first, a prominent role is given to expectation formation, where different mechanisms, from 
rational to adaptive or naïve expectation, can be implemented. Decision rules on the other hand 
relate to different theories of agents’ behavior, from zero-intelligence [Gode and Sunders 1993] 
to the Belief-Desire-Intention model often employed in the literature on Multi-Agent Systems 
[Woolridge 2009], to sophisticated forward-looking behavioral engines, possibly including RE 
optimization. The definition of a common API for these functions is relatively straightforward: 
the agent passes the function a set of inputs (states and parameters), and receives back an output 
(a new state, or an action). As long as different functions accept the same types of inputs and 
produce the same type of output, they can share a common interface, though in practice there 
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will be a different interface for each (type) of law of motion or decision rule considered (e.g. 
whether to look for a job as a dependent employee or as a self-employed, whether to create a 
new business, whether to stay or not in a market, what to consume, whether to buy or sell 
stocks, etc.). 
Point (ii) –the definition of abstract models of interactions– requires modelling markets. Here, I 
restrict my attention to search models of market interaction, where a match between supply and 
demand has to be found. Although markets are characterized by different institutional 
arrangements (auctions, limit order markets, bargaining, fixed price posting, etc.), one can think 
of defining just two interfaces depending on whether search is unilateral or bilateral.  
The common starting point is that one side of the market posts an offer, in terms of a bundle of 
characteristics. These might involve the quality, quantity and price of a consumption good; the 
wage (or a maximum wage), work hours, duration of the contract, and other job characteristics 
(e.g. location, skills required, agreeableness) for a vacancy; the ask price plus the quantity and 
maturity structure / expiration date of a financial instrument. I then distinguish between two 
types of offer processing.  
The first type (unilateral search) is first-come, first-served, and defines a one-to-one (1-to-1) 
relationship between the two sides of the market: whoever accepts the offer first gets the deal, 
and the offer is immediately withdrawn from the market. This is typically the case of goods and 
services (when there are more than one item on sale, the offer is repeated subject to availability). 
The API for 1-to-1 market transactions (unilateral search) only requires one side of the market 
to post offers, and the other side of the market to select. How offers are advertised (e.g. by shelf 
display, through intermediaries, by word-of-mouth, etc.), how agents come across offers (e.g. by 
random walking in a supermarket, by systematic search, etc.) and how they select one specific 
offer among the possibly many they have known about is related to the internal functioning of 
the agent and does not require to be standardized though an interface.17  
The second type of offer processing involves bilateral search: collecting expressions of interests, 
and then selecting a transaction partner among those who applied. It defines a many-to-many 
(m-to-m) relationship between the two sides of the market, which collapses to a one-to-many 
relationship when the interested applicants are allowed to make only one application each. 
Typical examples are job vacancies, financial instruments, and the marriage market. In this case, 
those who are looking for the good, service, security, job or mate need also specifying a bundle 
of characteristics (including a reservation price), which determine what offers are considered, 
and a maximum number of applications they send. Then, markets are distinguished in 
centralized or decentralized. In centralized markets (e.g. clearing houses, auctions) the market is 
a specific agent that matches demand and supply. No further action is required on the part of the 
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agents. In decentralized markets, agents on one side of the market must select a trading partner 
themselves (generally in competition with other agents), in an asynchronous manner. Again, the 
specific way selection is done is a problem of the agents and does not affect the interface. 
Hence, the API for m-to-m market transactions (bilateral search) requires both sides of the 
market to specify bundles of characteristics. Matching is then performed by a third agent (the 
market maker, in centralized markets) or by one side of the market (in decentralized markets). 
It is important to stress that the APIs sketched above are limited to search-and-match markets, 
which are a fairly general class of markets but by no means exhaust all the possible market 
structures. For instance, the Walrasian auctioneer, where the two sides of the market 
respectively specify a supply and demand schedule, remains outside their range of application.18 
One could argue that a Walrasian auctioneer is not compliant with the AB methodology (see 
above), and stop worrying; alternatively, one could write a specific API for Walrasian markets, 
or “tweak” the APIs in order to include the possibility of specifying demand and supply 
functions. The latter is actually quite simple to implement, as it is sufficient that both sides of 
the markets specify sets of bundles, rather than individual bundles –combinations of price and 
quantities that define a demand or a supply schedule. As it is often the case, there is a trade-off 
between generality and simplicity.  
 
PRACTICAL STEPS. Developing the economic APIs cannot be done only at a theoretical 
level, and requires testing on a large enough number of (simple) models. This in turns implies 
the development of a Modular Macroeconomic Simulator, a computational environment where 
the test models are completely modularized, in terms of markets considered and individual 
behavior (e.g. expectation formation and learning abilities). The Modular Macroeconomic 
Simulator has to be platform-specific, though it would be good to have different 
implementations using different simulation platforms. I will now discuss the potential of JAS-
mine, a simulation platform that I have contributed to develop, to evolve into a Modular 
Macroeconomic Simulator.  
JAS-mine (“Java Agent-based Simulation library. Modelling in a Networked environment”19) is 
a toolkit for AB and dynamic microsimulation modelling, in line with a trend of convergence of 
the two methodologies [Richiardi 2013]. The platform is generic and allows for all types of 
discrete-event simulations, not necessarily macroeconomic models. As such, it is a simulator, 
but not yet fully modular nor specifically macroeconomic. The platform provides standard tools 
which are frequently used both in AB modelling and dynamic microsimulations; these include 
scheduling of events, design of experiments, run-time monitoring and visualization, I/O 
communication (it features an embedded relational database, with flexible methods for 
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persisting the output of the simulations, in addition to automated CSV table creation), statistical 
analysis, GUI with plots and graphs etc. The main value added of the platform, however, is to 
give the researcher a guide / template on how to structure a generic simulation model, and in 
this respect makes it a good candidate for evolving into a Modular Macroecomic Simulator. In 
particular, JAS-mine favors the separation of data representation and management, which is 
automatically taken care of by the simulation engine, from the implementation of processes and 
behavioral algorithms, which should be the primary concern of the modeler. This results in 
quicker, more robust and more transparent model building. To be more precise, JAS-mine 
extends the Model-Observer paradigm introduced by the Swarm experience [Askenazi et al. 
1996] and introduces a new layer in simulation modelling, the Collector: 
 The Model deals mainly with specification issues, creating objects, relations between 
objects, and defining the order of events that take place in the simulation. 
 The Collector collects the data and compute the statistics both for use by the simulation 
objects and for post-mortem analysis of the model outcome, after the simulation has 
completed. 
 The Observer allows the user to inspect the simulation in real time and monitor some 
pre-defined outcome variables as the simulation unfolds. 
This three-layer methodological protocol allows for extensive re-use of code and facilitates 
model building, debugging and communication. Flexibility in model design and 
implementation, scalability of the code (that is, the code complexity must increase 
approximately linearly with the complexity of the underlying model, and must remain highly 
readable for debugging, cooperative development, and documentation), efficiency in data 
exchange and input-output communication, and compatibility with external software solutions 
and tools were the main specifications for the project.20 To meet those targets, JAS-mine is 
based on the following architectural choices: (a) object-oriented programming language (OOP), 
which provides a natural and intuitive way of modelling populations of agents; (b) strict 
adherence to the open-source paradigm; (c) use, whenever possible, of standard, open-source 
tools already available in the software development community (rather than development of an 
ad-hoc grammar and syntax); (d) close model-data integration (introduction of an ORM layer to 
connect the object-oriented simulation with an underlying SQL relational database management 
system). 
In particular, JAS-mine already includes alternative implementations of standard functionalities 
used in AB and microsimulation modelling, which can be used by the agents in the simulation 
following a modular approach. These include a library implementing a number of different 
matching methods, to match different lists of agents; a library implementing a number of 
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different alignment methods, to force the microsimulation outcomes meeting some exogenous 
aggregate targets; a library implementing a number of common econometric models, from 
continuous response linear regression models to binomial and multinomial logit and probit 
models, with tools to bootstrap the estimated coefficients to allow for uncertainty analysis; 
Turning JAS-mine into a Modular Macroeconomic Simulator is however a long-term project, 
which has just been spelled out.21 Again, it should be stressed that any platform / language could 
work as a testbed for developing the economic APIs, the only requirement possibly being, in 
order to foster collaborations, an open-source nature and a small upfront learning cost.22 
 
CONCLUSIONS. It can be argued that the popularity of DSGE macro-models is due only in 
part to their theoretical and empirical appeal. Other important determinants are: 
1. DSGE models are quite homogenous: they all follow the same methodological 
assumptions and modelling logic. 
2. Despite their being complicated models, writing a DSGE model is relatively easy, 
thanks to the availability of ready-to-use software tools (e.g. DYNARE, a Matlab 
plugin. An archive with more than 60 macroeconomic models implemented in 
DYNARE, with common diagnostic for systematic model comparison, is maintained at 
www.macromodelbase.com). 
3. Because of 1) and 2), and because it is relatively easy to publish DSGE-based papers, 
many Ph.D. students embark on DSGE modelling. This further reinforces their general 
acceptance. 
In contrast, AB models are heterogeneous and often criticized as ad-hoc. There is little 
awareness of the different modelling choices. Writing an AB model requires quite a lot of 
programming skills; code is often not re-usable and projects are not incremental.  
To improve on the current state of affairs and establish AB modelling as a standard practice in 
macroeconomics, two strategies seem possible. The first one can be described as a search for a 
silver-bullet: writing an AB model which is so good that everybody has to pay attention. This 
appears to be the strategy followed by the EURACE, POLHIA and CRISIS project. The 
problem with this strategy is that it easily leads to gigantic “multi-purpose” models that try to 
hit too many different targets (research questions) at the same time, with the consequence that it 
is very difficult to understand what matters, in explaining the model results.  
The second strategy refer to a meta-modelling approach: comparing many (relatively simple) 
AB models, which depart from each other –and possibly from the mainstream literature– only in 
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limited respects, so as to understand the effects of each deviation from the assumptions usually 
made in the literature. 
The first strategy tends to bypass the mainstream, while the latter makes continuous reference to 
the mainstream and often builds upon it. In particular, the meta-modelling strategy allows to 
understand systematically the impact of deviations from the standard assumptions of 
macroeconomic models: heterogeneity, imperfect information about the economic environment, 
replacement of RE with specific learning routines. Whilst the appeal of the silver-bullet strategy 
is not to be understated, I believe that the future of AB (macro-) modelling rests with the meta-
modelling strategy: creating a common computational environment that facilitates model 
comparison and model development, by adopting a fully modular approach. This requires that 
models follow a Lego™ approach, with new models created by combining modules and features 
of existing models, effectively creating a new Modular Macroeconomic Science.  
This vision, if successful, has the potential for radically transforming how research in AB 
macroeconomic modelling is done. I will therefore conclude by discussing why it has not been 
advanced before, and why it would be an extraordinary breakthrough for advancing the entire 
macroeconomic field.  
To start with, modularity is precluded in a DSGE setting because of the assumptions that agents 
(i) know a lot about the macroeconomic environment in which they are embedded, and (ii) are 
able to solve complicated optimization problems where the direct and indirect effects of 
individual choices have to be taken into account before actually implementing them, implying 
that all model components are fully connected and the model has to be solved as one single 
block.  
Second, modularity has not been exploited so far in AB modelling because of the high fixed cost 
involved in developing a flexible simulator, where modules can be easily combined, replaced or 
extended. The relative novelty of the methodology, and the incentives for immediate returns in 
terms of publications and funding, have resulted in highly specific computational architecture 
and “disposable” models. Also, modularization involves the definition of appropriate economic 
APIs, to allow the interoperability of different modules, and the implementation of many small-
scale models, possibly taken from the literature, in order to test the APIs and produce an initial 
library of modules. Both tasks have a public good nature, and require a lot of infrastructure 
building.  
As for what concerns the possible benefits of a modular approach for AB modelling, these 
include (i) more efficient model building, stemming from the possibility to integrate 
components developed by previous researchers –e.g. the housing market of Geanakoplos et al. 
[2012] with the financial market of Poledna et al. [2014] and the labor market of Richiardi 
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[2006], (ii) more general results, stemming from systematically testing and comparing 
alternative specifications –e.g. the financial market of Poledna et al. [2014] with that of Teglio 
et al. [2012], or different learning algorithms as in Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion [2015], (iii) better 
documentation of the model structure, (iv) increased cooperation of different research groups.  
Exploiting AB modelling to its full potential will clarify to what extent the methodology is an 
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1 For a discussion of the roots of AB modelling, see Richiardi [2013]. 
2 While basically all DSGE, RBC and NK models are macro models, most AB models fall outside the 
macro literature (many pertain to ecological and consumers’ choice modelling or finance). When adding 
the keywords “macroeconomy” or “macroeconomics” to the search, the fraction of AB models to 
DSGE/RBC/NK models falls to 3.6%. 
3 FP6-STREP grant 035086, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/79429_en.html. See also: 
http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/lehrbereiche/vwl/etace/Eurace_Unibi/. 
4 FP7-SSH grant 225408, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89951_en.html. 
5 FP7-ICT grant 288501, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/101350_en.html.See also: 
 http://www.crisis-economics.eu/. 
6 “If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it” [Epstein, 2007]. 
7 As pointed out by one referee, there is always a risk in having a restricted number of workhorse models 
dominating the scene. However, the computational nature of AB models implies that it will always be 





12 To this regard, the literature on AB modelling seems to be completely unaware of both the problems 
and the available solutions. In particular, implementation of agents as UML states machines, an evolution 
of finite state machines (FSMs), is worth consideration. FSMs are important in event-driven 
programming because they make event handling explicitly dependent on both the event-type (e.g. the 
contracts an agent is offered) and on the state of the system (e.g. the agent’s internal state). FSMs can 
drastically cut down the number of execution paths through the code, simplify the conditions tested at 
each branching point, and simplify the switching between different modes of execution. Conversely, 
using event-driven programming without an underlying FSM model can lead programmers to produce 
error prone, difficult to extend and excessively complex application code. Though traditional FSMs are an 
excellent tool for tackling smaller problems, they tend to become unmanageable for more involved 
systems. Due to the phenomenon known as state and transition explosion, the complexity of a traditional 
FSM tends to grow much faster than the complexity of the system it describes. This happens because the 
traditional state machine formalism inflicts repetitions. UML state machines address exactly this 
shortcoming of the conventional FSMs. They provide a number of features for eliminating the repetitions 
so that the complexity of a UML state machine no longer explodes but tends to faithfully represent the 
complexity of the reactive system it describes. 
13 The distinction between an individual characteristic and a parameter is sometimes arbitrary. Generally 
speaking, characteristics can evolve over time, while parameters remain constant. However, it is possible 
to think of immutable characteristics (like gender, or “human capital potential”), and time-dependent 
parameters (like technological parameters). Distinguishing between parameters and states has mainly a 
conceptual value, and has no impact on the functioning of an agent. 
14 Breaking a contract should result in a revision of the list of commitments. Note that transactions do not 
need to be consensual (for instance, breaking a contract is typically a one-sided decision). 
15 Conditional commitments can be represented as maps, where the conditions (including time) define the 
keys, and value determines the change in the specific endowment considered. 
16 Meta-decision rules can be devised that change a decision rule on the basis of the states. 
17 It is thus in principle possible that agents look for a newly released smart phone in shopping malls, 
while the producer only sells it over the internet: the consumers do not get their craved for little object, 
while the launch of the new phone ends up in a flop. This will translate in poor measures of fitness (a 
state), both for the consumers and the producer, possibly prompting a change in the respective search 
strategy (an action).  
18 I thank Doyne Farmer for having pointed this out. 
19 See Richiardi and Richardson (2015), available for download at www.jas-mine.net. 
20 An exercise aimed at testing the performance of the simulation platform with respect to scaling 
involved the implementation in JAS-mine of a complex mixed AB-microsimulation model of the two-
way relationship between health and economic inequality [Wolfson et al., 2016], calibrated on both US 
and Canadian cities. The JAS-mine implementation can run 5 million agents with a time-step equivalent 
to 1 day for 500 years (182,500 time-steps) in 50 minutes on a standard laptop (using less than 4GB of 
RAM). 
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21 As a referee noted, a first step would be to consolidate the achievements in AB modelling obtained so 
far. I cannot stress enough the desirability of some collaborative effort in order to formulate standards or 
best practices regarding model documentation, testing, accessibility of code and tools, and replicability of 
experiments for the plenty of models that already exist - see also [Leombruni et al., 2006]. 
22 This effectively restricts the choice to platforms based on commonly used programming languages, as 
Java, C++, and possibly R, Matlab and Python (the latter however have some limitations as far as speed 
of execution is concerned). 
